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a b s t r a c t
Ecosystem services research has highlighted the importance of ecosystems for human well-being. Most
of the research, however, focuses only on aggregate human well-being and disregards distributional and
equity issues associated with ecosystem services. We review approaches from institutional economics,
political ecology and the social sciences in order to develop an analytical framework to understand the
distribution of beneﬁts from ecosystems across different socio-cultural groups and the underlying social
processes involved. We then present a case study of the distribution of provisioning ecosystem services
in a forest-fringe village in Odisha, India. Our analysis shows the unequal distribution of ecosystem
services and complex social processes that determine these. We identify the determining factors and
processes to include: differential resource-speciﬁc needs, different cultural identities, differentiated
social status and bargaining power, exclusionary and inclusionary social practices, differential access.
Our analysis proves therefore that aggregation of forest ecosystem beneﬁts obscures crucially important
patterns of distribution, and the underlying social processes that determine these. This also demon-
strates the necessity of applying social science frameworks in such analyses. Our study also shows that
most ecosystem services are co-produced through both ecosystem processes and social actions, and so
their assessment cannot be separated from the social context in which they are embedded. In conclusion
we recommend that ecosystem services research engages more with process-oriented, context-speciﬁc
and integrated approaches, based on a recognition of the complexity of social-ecological realities.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
In the last decade, ‘ecosystem services’ has become a dominant
concept for researchers, global development agents, and policy makers
in thinking about the relationship between human societies and
ecosystems (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010; Lele et al., 2013;
Norgaard, 2010). The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (hereafter
MA) (MA, 2005) deﬁned ecosystem services as “the beneﬁts people
obtain from ecosystems” and classiﬁed the multiple forms of these
services, both direct and indirect, essentially arguing that conservation
of ecosystems can simultaneously serve development goals. The MA,
followed by The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity report
(TEEB, 2008), triggered a large body of ecological-economic research
that has focused on identiﬁcation, quantiﬁcation, mapping and
aggregate economic valuation of ecosystem services (Fisher et al.,
2009; Nicholson et al., 2009; Vihervaara et al., 2010).
Although the concept of ecosystem services has helped empha-
size the role of ecosystems as important contributors to human
well-being, the vast majority of studies only consider aggregate
well-being, without questioning how these contributions are
socially distributed2. This follows, perhaps unconsciously, from
the normative bias in the MA conceptual framework, wherein the
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ecosystem is the primary consideration, and human well-being is
derived from ecosystem services in a somewhat unilinear manner
(see Lele, 2013). Contributions to well-being are speciﬁed as
‘security’, ‘social cohesion’, and ‘freedom’ (MA, 2005), but concepts
which would differentiate the distribution of beneﬁts (and costs);
like ‘equity’ or ‘fairness’ are not mentioned. A further limitation of
the ecosystem services literature is that social analysis is limited to
estimating economic value or marginal change in it. The under-
lying assumption is that ecosystems degrade because policy-
makers do not know their ‘true’ contribution to human well-
being. This is a major oversimpliﬁcation, but it has nevertheless
prevailed in ecological-economic research circles (see Norgaard,
2010). The ﬁndings generated by such research ﬁnd easy entry into
neoliberal policy processes that are already heavily biased against
distributional questions. We argue that ecosystem services
research will be unable to fully achieve even the objective of
combining ecosystem conservation and development if equity
issues are ignored. The link between ecosystem services and
well-being is poorly conceptualised for at least two further
reasons. Firstly, ecosystem services are rarely the result of nature
simply giving them to society. Instead, most ecosystem beneﬁts
are co-produced through social processes involving labour and
capital interacting with ecosystems, mediated through institutions
like property rights. (Lele, 2009; Lele et al., 2013). Secondly,
procedural and distributional equity are important autonomous
aspects of well-being. Therefore, whether one’s goal is to conserve
ecosystems, to enhance human well-being, or to alleviate poverty,
an understanding of the relevant social processes is essential. With
this paper we put equity and social justice on the agenda of
ecosystem services research as essential aspects of human well-
being, by showing how access to ecosystems and the ability to
derive value from them is shaped by various social factors.
As development sector actors have attempted to link their
agendas such as poverty alleviation and inclusive growth (implicitly
recognizing issues of equity and social justice) to the concept of
ecosystem services, the normative and analytical lacunae discussed
above have become increasingly obvious (Lele, 2013). As Daw et al.
(2011) point out, “By deﬁnition, aggregate measures of ES [ecosys-
tem services] ﬂows are poor indicators […] in the same way that
national aggregate indices of wealth […] hide wide variations in the
wealth and fortunes of the poorest members of society”. They argue
that ecosystem services research needs targeted disaggregation
approaches that “identify appropriate groups for disaggregation
by examining access mechanisms for speciﬁc ES and livelihood
proﬁles, perhaps using grounded ethno-ecological research” (ibid.).
Similarly, Fisher et al. (2013) present an analytical framework
focused on “social differentiation and its implications for access to
ecosystem services: the social ‘ﬁlter’ regulating the contribution of
ecosystem services to wellbeing”. However, these authors present
little primary empirical evidence to substantiate their contentions.
We believe that if ecosystem services research is to move beyond
these oversimpliﬁcations and encompass the distributional dimen-
sion currently absent from the operational deﬁnition of human
well-being, it must begin to scrutinize the dialectical processes
between ecosystems and well-being. This paper is an attempt to
exemplify such an approach.
In this paper, we take the normative position that the concepts
of development and human well-being by deﬁnition include
paying attention to the distributive dimension (Mitlin and
Hickey, 2009) and we seek to characterise the nature of ecosystem
service ﬂows through this lens. In addition, we demonstrate that
the social processes that shape the distribution of ecosystem
services can be very complex and require drawing upon multiple
explanatory models from the social sciences. As a means of theory
testing (proof of principle) and a base for theoretical general-
ization, we present an in-depth case study of the social
distribution of beneﬁts from the use of forest ecosystems in a
community-managed forest in Odisha state of India. We use this
case study approach to (1) describe the distribution of three
provisioning ecosystem services (goat grazing beneﬁts, bamboo
beneﬁts, and beneﬁts pertaining to the three most widely used
non-timber forest products (NTFPs)) across socio-cultural groups
(including class, caste, gender), and (2) explain the observed
distribution of ecosystem services in terms of the underlying
social processes.
In this paper, we ﬁrst summarise the main theoretical
approaches in social sciences used to explaining the distribution
of beneﬁts from natural resources. We then present the case study,
describing the study area and context and then presenting the
distribution of beneﬁts from three provisioning ecosystem services
derived by households belonging to various social groups. Subse-
quently, we provide a detailed qualitative explanation of the
factors shaping this distribution, and ﬁnish by discussing the
theoretical and methodological implications of these ﬁndings.
2. Explaining social distribution of ecosystem services: An
overview of relevant theories
The social science literature features several ways of consider-
ing and explaining the social distribution of beneﬁts from natural
resources (natural resources ranging from mineral resources to
(NTFPs). Economists studying common property resources in
developing countries have a long tradition of examining the
comparative distribution of beneﬁts and costs from such
resources, in what forms and why. Pioneering studies of the
commons for instance (e.g. Jodha, 1986; Nadkarni et al., 1989)
were sensitive to institutional arrangements and outcomes,
although later work (e.g. Adhikari, 2005; Coulibaly-Lingani et al.,
2009; Narain et al., 2008) has tended to focus more on the role
played by private asset ownership in inﬂuencing what beneﬁts
individuals can derive from the commons3.
Such assessments typically study existing distributions of resources
and their relation to (common property) institutions, but do not
research underlying processes of how these institutions of natural
resource use emerge and are under continuous change as a result of
political processes (Mosse, 1997), nor the strategies that different
actors take to negotiate such institutions (Milgroom et al., 2014). Also,
this literature generally assumes that if actors have the preference for
certain resources, little prevents them from accessing them.
Economic geographers, among others, have pointed to the role
of spatial and demographic factors in the social distribution of
natural resource beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally, they have highlighted the
bio-geographical context (e.g. soil condition, topography, hydrology
and distribution patterns of useful species) and the location of users
in relation to the natural resource and to markets and adminis-
trative centres. These affect, for example, the effort required per
unit of resource harvested (Gallup et al., 1999), thereby bringing
into play demographic factors such as household size.
Some distributional differences, such as choice of species har-
vested or method of resource management, affecting nutritional
and economic outcomes, have been explained by ecological anthro-
pologists in terms cultural preferences, knowledge and ethnic
identity (Fa et al., 2002; Maikhuri and Ramakrishnan, 1991). Here
the focus is on differences in cultural preferences between social
groups, not imposed structural inequity.
In contrast to these individualistic, geographical or cultural expla-
nations of resource use distribution, political ecology and political
3 The literature on the institutional aspects of common property resources has
typically focused more on the sustainability of institutions rather than their
distributional outcomes (e.g. Agrawal, 2001).
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economy researchers have traditionally had a stronger concern for
equity (Bryant and Jarosz, 2004) and have explained this distribution
as the outcome of place-based histories and structures of unequal
social and power relations. These may be disparities in class (Blaikie,
1985; Peet and Watts, 2004), caste (Agrawal, 2005; Beck and Ghosh,
2000; Bose et al., 2012; Gadgil and Guha, 1992), gender (Peluso, 1991;
Rocheleau, 1995) as well as other forms of social stratiﬁcation. As
Thomas-Slaytor and Rocheleau (1995) note, access to and control of
resources is strongly inﬂuenced by local cultural classiﬁcations of
ethnicity, race, class and gender (see also Crane, 2010). Political
ecological research has also shown how environmental change and
resource use can reinforce unequal social relations, or are even
purposely used to do so (Bryant, 1992; Bryant et al., 1993). Institutions
of resource use and access are thus seen by this ﬁeld as emerging
phenomena of complex, multi-scale, multi-actor political relations
(Crane, 2010; Watts, 2000).
An important point highlighted by a limited sub-section of the
political ecology literature is that not only might distribution of
beneﬁts within a user community be skewed, but some user groups
may be structurally excluded from beneﬁts altogether (Du Toit, 2004;
Fisher, 2007; Gore, 1994). This may be easily overlooked in common
property and ecosystem services research which tends to only study
beneﬁt ﬂows to existing users, while non-users remain invisible.
The “Theory of Access” proposed by Ribot and Peluso (2003)
provides a bridge between the focus on variations in individual asset
ownership and preferences, and the focus on social access and
structure. It argues that the extent of resource access is inﬂuenced
by a combination of the ability to gain basic access through access
mechanisms such as access to other physical assets, credit, ﬁnancial
capital, labour, knowledge, and social networks, and the ability to
make use of additional constellations of such access mechanisms to
gain complementary access and so derive more beneﬁt from the same
resources (Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Ribot, 1998). Building on access
theory, Milgroom et al. (2014) argue that access should not be seen as
a structural and static given, governed by customary law, rights-based
access and access mechanisms, but as an ever-evolving assembly of
practices of a wide variety of actors who employ their skills and power
to creatively negotiate rules and structures to optimize their beneﬁts.
Below we summarize the factors inﬂuencing the social dis-
tribution of ecosystem services:
Agent-level factors
– individual preferences
– ownership of assets and abilities
– household size
– locational factors (distance, terrain and resource quality)
– ethnicity, collective identity and cultural preferences
Structural factors
– caste, class, gender disparities
– social exclusion
– access (basic and complementary)
Structure–agency dynamics
– access negotiation (skill/power)
We keep these multiple dimensions in mind as we investigate
the distribution of beneﬁts from a tropical forest ecosystem in
Odisha, India.
3. The case study context
3.1. Community forest management as the focus
We chose a community-managed forest as the site for this
investigation, because in community-managed forests, there is gen-
erally a 'one-to-one' relationship between the forest as a resource
catchment and the user community. Moreover, in this management
form there is a clear connection between the provisioning and
distribution of forest ecosystem services and village-level social
institutions, which are in turn embedded in social organizations
and relations. This makes studying the social processes governing
the distribution of ecosystem services feasible.
Fig. 1. Location of study site in India.
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The state of Odishawas selected for this study because it has among
the highest densities of community-initiated forest protection any-
where in the world (Conroy et al., 2002). In India, the Forest Depart-
ment gradually took control of most forests, after Independence
declaring many ‘Deemed’ Reserved Forests, without properly settling
rights. The State appropriation ruptured them from the prior institu-
tions, most of which near settlements were community-based (Gadgil
and Guha, 1992). However, the department, which due to limited
institutional capacity and political pressures to favour commercial
interests, was not able to prevent large-scale deforestation in these
forests, effectively turned many into degraded open-access areas. As a
consequence, local resource users were no longer able to ﬁnd enough
wood for their daily needs in these forests, and in many locations they
organized to reappropriate and protect the resource (Springate-
Baginski and Blaikie, 2007). In Odisha, starting from the 1970–1980s,
this reappropriation has especially been successful (Conroy et al., 2002).
It is estimated that between 8000 and 12000 initiatives combine to
protect a forest area of 2 million hectares (Y. Giri Rao, personal
communication). Although the Forest Department remains the de jure
owner and manager of most of the forests in the state and does not
ofﬁcially recognize community-based initiatives, it has tolerated de
facto community control, as this has proven an effective form of forest
protection which does not require any governmental input.
As a case study site, we have chosen the Teen Mauza commu-
nity, which is situated in the Ranpur block of Nayagarh district,
Odisha (see Fig. 1). The reason for selecting this community is that
it is occupationally diverse and ethnically heterogeneous (includ-
ing Scheduled Tribes (ST4), Scheduled Castes (SC5), and General
Caste6 households) with a well functioning day-to-day protection
system that has been in place for almost a decade without
interference from the Forest Department. The Ranpur range is
part of the Eastern Ghats and its forests are classiﬁed as “moist
mixed deciduous” in the Champion and Seth (1968) classiﬁcation,
being dominated by Anogeissus latifolia, Aegle marmelos, and
Dillenia pentagyna. Calcutta Bamboo (Dendrocalamus strictus) is
also a major species in the forest. The main livelihood activity of
most rural households in the region is agriculture, but there is
signiﬁcant and varying dependence on livestock rearing and the
collection of NTFPs. Forests thus play a signiﬁcant role both in the
domestic sector (providing ﬁrewood, edible plants and house
construction material) and the production sector (providing
grazing and commercially valuable NTFPs).
3.2. Forest protection and ecosystem services use in Teen Mauza
The Teen Mauza (literally meaning ‘three villages’) community
forest management (CFM) initiative was started in 2002 by the
villagers of Akhupadar, Basantapur and Lakhapada. They took over
a degraded patch of Reserve Forest, adjoining Akhupadar village.
Although community protection (involving only Akhupadar and
Basantapur) had been attempted in 1998, it had broken down
within two years and then was recommenced in 2002 with the
inclusion of Lakhapada households. The location of these villages
vis-à-vis the community forest and the larger landscape is shown
in Fig. 2. The forest is only ﬁve kilometres from Ranpur town,
where the nearest market is situated. Due to the community’s
efforts over the past ten years, the forest has regenerated steadily
from shrubland to a denser forest stage, but regeneration is still
on-going. In physical terms this means that at the moment less
than 5% of the trees are above 50 cm in girth (at breast height); the
total standing stock is around 93 t per hectare7.
The community forest protection group currently consists of all
resident households of Akhupadar (15 hhs, all Scheduled Tribes),
and of Basantapur (24 hhs, all General Caste), and 39 General Caste
households out of 85 resident households of Lakhapada, that is, 78
households in all (see Table 1). They are protecting 155 ha of forest
Fig. 2. Teen Mauza and its village areas relative to the forest (shaded area is CFM), adapted from http://www.odishasampad.in.
4 The term Scheduled Tribes (STs) refers to over 400 indigenous and fringe
communities that were in 1950 included in an ofﬁcial schedule of the Constitution
of India (Bose et al., 2012). Tribal people have traditionally been outside of the caste
system.
5 Just as the tribal people, the lowest castes of the caste system have also been
included in an ofﬁcial constitutional schedule: these have been classiﬁed as
‘Scheduled Castes’ (SCs), also known as ‘untouchables’, or, Dalits.
6 We classiﬁed all the people who are not STs or SCs as General Caste in
our study.
7 For the larger PEFESPA project (http://www.atree.org/ The_Political_Ecology_of_-
Forest_Ecosystem_Services_and_Poverty_Alleviation_PEFESPA_project) of which this
study served as a case study, a team of researchers and ﬁeld staff assessed the standing
stock of different forest sites in Odisha, using standardized girth at breast hight (GBH)
measurements and ecological, geometric calculations.
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using a daily forest patrol duty carried out in rotation by two adult
men at a time. The total population of Teen Mauza, including those
households which have not been accepted for forest protection is
about 550.
The participating households are expected to protect the forest
against ﬁre, enforce a no-hunting rule, collect dry fuel wood (not
fresh) only in weekends, and maintain an annual harvest ceiling of
two bundles of fresh bamboo. The occasional harvesting of poles
can be done upon payment, but only if permission of the forest
protection committee is gained. The sale of fuel wood, bamboo
and poles outside the community is not allowed. The Forest
Department, the de jure owner of the forest, does not allow the
harvest of timber beyond low-intensity subsistence use.
In Ranpur, access to at least the essential forest products such
as bamboo and fuel wood is generally organized on a per-
community base: collection of these resources by non-
community users is considered a violation of the CFM rules. As
all the people of one protection community have roughly the same
access to forest products, access is mainly determined by whether
one is considered part of the community or not.
This situation has not been static since the start of CFM: there have
been many immigrants and people have moved between commu-
nities. Because these ‘newcomers’ are seen as free-riders by the
protecting communities, these people are excluded from the CFM
system altogether. Currently, 46 households in Teen Mauza are
considered outsiders by the pre-existing community and they are
not allowed to use the forest. This includes a small hamlet just outside
Lakhapada with 10 Scheduled Castes households of bamboo artisans
who are excluded from both CFM and community life. Most of these
excluded households are landless and have no livestock. They get the
majority of their income from wage labour and sharecropping; the
bamboo artisans are solely dependent on bamboo basket-making, and
so can be expected to suffer signiﬁcantly from the exclusion.
For this study we look at the distribution of pertinent provi-
sioning ecosystem services for the community: bamboo beneﬁts
(bamboo is overall the most-used forest product, extracted by 75%
of the protecting households, hence we address it separately from
the other NTFPs), grazing beneﬁts (the Teen Mauza forest forms an
important catchment for goat grazing, cattle do not enter the
forest), and NTFP provision (siali leaves (Bauhinia vahlii), edible
tubers and mushrooms; the three most collected NTFPs). We
excluded fuelwood from our distributional study, as fuelwood
extraction is only for domestic use and is relatively equal on a per
capita basis, as fuelwood is the prime cooking fuel in the area.
4. Methods
Data was collected through a range of methods to understand
the social processes around the distribution of ecosystem services
and costs. Between November 2011 and February 2012 the lead
author lived in Teen Mauza and participated in daily livelihood
activities, including grazing, the collection of fuel wood, bamboo
and NTFPs, and agricultural activities. The lead author, with help of
the PEFESPA project research team, conducted a mixed-method
methodology of focus group meetings, a stratiﬁed household survey
(sampling rate 40%) and semi-structured interviews with key
informants using snowball sampling. The household survey was
conducted among 32 randomly selected households in three
different wealth strata (derived through community-veriﬁed wealth
ranking). It covered households’ demographics, occupation, assets,
land ownership and livestock grazing, crop damage, forest govern-
ance, and included a detailed fuel wood, timber and NTFP survey.
Survey results were analysed using SPSS statistical software.
To qualitatively explain the variation in ecosystem service
beneﬁts across households and communities in terms of underlying
social processes, we used an abductive approach (Walters and
Vayda, 2009) based on eliminative inference. This implied systema-
tic testing of alternative explanations of ecosystem service distribu-
tion which emerged from qualitative data from participant
observation, key informant interviews and focus group discussions,
and eliminating evidently false ones. In the following sections, we
ﬁrst describe the distribution of bamboo, grazing and NTFP collec-
tion between the different user groups, and then give a grounded
explanation of the social processes shaping this distribution.
5. Results
5.1. Distribution of ecosystem services in Teen Mauza
5.1.1. Bamboo beneﬁts
There are three important user groups involved in bamboo
harvesting: Scheduled Tribes CFM households, General Caste CFM
households, and a group of non-CFM Scheduled Castes basket
weavers living in a hamlet just outside Lakhapada. On average,
the Scheduled Tribes households of Teen Mauza collect more
bamboo per year (signiﬁcant under a 80% conﬁdence interval) than
the General Caste ones: 111 kg (2.2 head loads/bundles; a bundle/
headload of bamboo was measured to averagely be approximately
Table 1
The socio-economic composition of Teen Mauza’s households.
Number of households involved in
protection
Social
composition
Wealth rank distribution,
by household
Main livelihood activities Landholdings (ha)
Richer Medium Poorer
Akhupadar 15 Scheduled Tribes 6 (40%) 9 (60%) 0 (0%) Agriculture, NTFPn sale, wage
labour
Mean: 1.05
Min: 0.61
Max: 2.02
No. of landless hhs: 0
(0%)
Basantapur 24 General Caste 12
(50%)
7 (29%) 5 (21%) Agriculture, horticulture, wage
labour
Mean: 1.21
Min: 0
Max: 4.05
No. of landless hhs: 1
(4%)
Lakhapada 39 General Caste 7 (18%) 11 (28%) 21 (54%) Agriculture, wage labour,
horticulture
Mean: 0.53
Min: 0
Max: 2.83
No. of landless hhs: 8
(21%)
n NTFP¼non-timber forest products.
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50 kg), compared to 75 kg (1.5 head loads) for the latter (see
Table 2). The Scheduled Castes bamboo artisans were included in
this ecosystem services ﬂow comparison, because they are critically
dependent on bamboo for their livelihood, because they are land-
less, own no livestock and do not collect any other NTFPs. We
consider them legitimate bamboo users, as they have been collect-
ing bamboo from the Teen Mauza forest for years in the past, but
are currently effectively excluded by the community protection
system.
5.1.2. Grazing beneﬁts
The users deriving grazing beneﬁts in Teen Mauza may be divided
into three distinct groups: graziers from within the CFM community
(3 households holding 130 goats in all), graziers from neighbouring
communities (four households together holding 135 goats), and one
rich, town-based, absentee herd owner, owning 235 goats. These
groups differ from each other in two ways: group 1 (from within
Teen Mauza) contributes to forest protection, whereas groups 2 and
3 don’t. In terms of socio-economic position, groups 1 and 2 are
similar (mid- or low-income), while group 3 (the absentee herd
owner) belongs to a higher socio-economic class.
The grazing areas and grazing intensity of these three groups of
graziers are given in Table 3. Non-community graziers are making
5.7 times more use of grazing beneﬁts of the community forest
than those who are part of the protection community, who might
be seen as the ‘rightful' beneﬁciaries of the service. The absentee
herd owner, who is not in any way part of the traditional grazing
system, accounts for 57% of the grazing beneﬁts of the community
forest of Teen Mauza. The community forest is thus being heavily
utilized by graziers from outside the community, whereas com-
munity goat graziers are conﬁned to less suitable grazing lands,
such as village fallows and degraded wasteland. In Section 5.2.2,
we explain why this is happening.
5.1.3. NTFP provision
In this section we compare between the three most collected
NTFPs in the community: siali leaves, tubers and mushrooms.
Looking at the wider NTFP use pattern in Teen Mauza, there are
only two user groups and both are from within the community. Of
these user groups, the Scheduled Tribes people of Akhupadar are
the most forest-dependent, collecting and consuming a wide
variety of NTFPs from the forest. The General Caste people of
Basantapur and Lakhapadadepend on the forest for fuelwood and
bamboo, but do not collect much else.
About 83% of the Scheduled Tribe households collect siali leaves
from the forest for the making of leaf plates, and none of the non-ST
households. Additionally, 100% of the Scheduled Tribe households
collect tubers and mushrooms, while for the non-ST households
this is less than 50%. Both relatively and absolutely, the Scheduled
Tribes households of Akhupadar are using the large majority of the
NTFP provision service, while they only make up 20% of the Teen
Mauza protection households. On a per household basis, the
average yearly collection of tubers in Akhupadar is almost 150
times greater than that of the General Caste households, while for
mushrooms the difference is a factor of 21 (see Table 4). Another
aspect of NTFP use reﬂected in Table 4 is the difference in the
involvement of women in NTFP collection between Scheduled
Tribes and General Caste households: in over 80% of the Scheduled
Tribes households, women are involved in the collection of the
listed NTFP species, while the General Caste women only collect
mushrooms, and that holds for only 4% of the households.
5.2. The social processes of ecosystem service distribution in Teen
Mauza
5.2.1. Bamboo collection and social exclusion
Bamboo is one of the most important NTFPs in the Ranpur
region, as it is a crucial rooﬁng material for most of the house
types in the area. Also, bamboo forms a very important NTFP for
artisanal craftsmen who make baskets and other agricultural
equipment. All bamboo users of Teen Mauza’s protection commu-
nity have the same rights to the collection and use of green
bamboo: a maximum of two bundles (100 kg) per household per
year is allowed to be harvested. Sale of bamboo and bamboo
products is not allowed.
Because of its importance, bamboo is not an open-access
resource: only members of a forest protection community are
customarily entitled to collect bamboo. Therefore, access pertain-
ing to bamboo in Teen Mauza is determined by the history and
politics of who has the right to call themself a community member
and use the forest resources, and who does not. If ‘outsiders’ want
to gain access to bamboo from the community’s forest they have
two options: either paying a relatively large fee (10000 Indian
rupees (or about 160 USD), equivalent to over two months
minimum-wage salary) to become an ofﬁcial member of the
protection community, or using "illegal access mechanisms"
(Ribot and Peluso, 2003) to harvest bamboo. In Teen Mauza, none
of the new families has been able to afford the expected fee, and
thus none of them has been allowed in the forest protection
community.
Table 2
Distribution of bamboo in Teen Mauza.
Type of user group Scheduled Tribes households of Akhupadar Basantapur and Lakhapada households Scheduled Castes people
Number of hhs in Teen Mauza 15 63 10
Reported average use of bamboo/hh/year 111 kg 75 kg 0 kg
Total yearly bamboo use (percentage of total) 1.67 t (26%) 4.73 t (74%) 0 t (0%)
Table 3
Distribution of grazing ecosystem service amongst graziers of Teen Mauza.
Type of user group Teen Mauza graziers Graziers from neighbouring communities Absentee herd-owner
Number of goats 130 135 235
Goat.daysa of grazing in Teen Mauza CFM area 150 285b 570
Goat.days of grazing in other areas 760 510b 1075
Total goat.days in Teen Mauza CFM (%) 150 (15%) 285 (28%) 570 (57%)
a Goat.days is used as a unit to reﬂect grazing intensity, and is deﬁned as the number of goats multiplied by the number of grazing days per week.
b Do not count up to a total of 945 goat.days, because not all grazing localities of these graziers are known.
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Amongst those who have access, the difference in use level
between the Scheduled Tribes and General Caste community house-
holds (111 compared to 75 kg of bamboo per year, see Table 2) cannot
be explained in terms of a difference in access. Instead it is related to
a difference in bamboo needs for housing. Although the Scheduled
Tribes people on average collect slightly more bamboo than the
allowed quota, this is tolerated by the community, as their more
traditional housing requires more bamboo.
Thus, while the higher domestic needs of the ST community are
accommodated, the critical livelihood dependence of the basket
makers is not. Even if they were able to afford to pay the ‘entrance
fee’ to gain usufruct rights, their bamboo-based livelihood would
still be in conﬂict with the community rules, as these forbid sale.
It appears that the exclusion of SC bamboo artisans from the
CFM group is a reﬂection of a wider pattern of exclusion in
traditional rural Odisha society. As in the social hierarchy of rural
Odisha, the Scheduled Castes people’s status is at the very bottom,
the formulation of the no-sale rule for bamboo could be seen as a
political policy aimed at structurally excluding SC people from the
outset. This especially holds because there is an abundance of
bamboo in Teen Mauza forest, which implies that the ecology of
the forest does not require bamboo harvesting restrictions8.
5.2.2. Grazing: Basic and complementary access, livelihood
preferences and power
This section starts with a description of the social process of
gaining basic access to goat grazing in Teen Mauza. As the
community forest lies available, every household in Teen Mauza
can gain access to grazing beneﬁts by starting a herd. However, in
practice certain assets and cultural norms form a barrier for
households in turning to grazing in the ﬁrst place.
The most important assets are access to ﬁnancial capital to
invest in an initial herd, and access to labour, as goat grazing
requires daily herding. Some grazing households start with a
relatively small herd, while also grazing other households’ goats
as a paid service. For this however, one has to have sufﬁcient
status in the community in order to be trusted. In addition,
specialized knowledge is required, especially when it comes to
dealing with the birth and rearing of baby goats and medical
treatment of goats in case of injury or disease.
Cultural norms codetermine why only three households in Teen
Mauza are engaged in grazing as a livelihood. In Ranpur, although
goat rearing can be a rather lucrative livelihood strategy, social
status depends on land ownership. All the grazing households in
the community own at least one acre of land, which means that
part of their available labour is used for agricultural work besides
grazing: it would be seen as culturally very inappropriate to sell all
one’s land and become a specialized grazing household.
Like all social and livelihood activities in Teen Mauza, grazing is
inﬂuenced by cultural identity. The General Caste households of
the culturally homogeneous village of Basantapur are of a caste
that locally is associated with land ownership and rice cultivation.
Although some of these households own goats, grazing is seen as
an inappropriate livelihood strategy for them, which leads them to
outsource this work to others. Remarkably, none of the poor,
landless households in Basantapur village have resorted to grazing
as a livelihood option.
Ultimately, grazing forms only a viable livelihood for those
households in the community which have enough start-up ﬁnan-
cial and/or social capital, which do not have much land, are not
from Basantapur, and have the prerequisite knowledge. At the
same time, starting a large herd in Teen Mauza was no problem for
the absentee herd-owner, as he easily meets the socio-economic
prerequisites and through hiring caste-herders he is not affected
by cultural norms regarding livelihood identity.
The variation in existing forest grazing beneﬁts enjoyed by
different graziers (see Table 3), who have all gained basic access
can be explained by differences in the use of additional comple-
mentary access mechanisms. Given the steep, thickly forested,
thorny, and leopard-infested nature of the forests in Ranpur, at
least two graziers are needed to safely guide a herd of goats, but few
families can afford to spend so much on labour. This problem can be
circumvented by pooling the labour of two grazing families, which
is currently done by some outside graziers, but is not practiced in
Teen Mauza. Because of compromised access to labour and labour-
pooling and no capital to hire it, the Teen Mauza graziers are mostly
restricted to the much poorer village fallows and wasteland on
which one grazier per herd is sufﬁcient. Only some community
graziers spend part of their time in the community forest; as much
as they can afford, with those who can spare more labour being
better able to beneﬁt. For example, one of the community’s goat
herds spends 2.5 days in the forest, because only on these days the
son, who is in charge, can get support from one of his aging parents
(see Table 3). The community protected forest thus cannot be
converted into grazing beneﬁts for the community.
Differences in herd size between the different grazing house-
holds in Teen Mauza can also be explained in terms of available
labour: the two community grazing households which graze 50
goats, have more available labour (one main grazier and regular
Table 4
Distribution of main NTFPs in Teen Mauza.
Type of user group (village-based) Akhupadar (ST) (15 hhs) Basantapur and Lakhapada
(General Caste) (63 hhs)
Percentage of hhs collecting
(% by womena)
Percentage of hhs collecting
(% by womena)
Average yearly income per hh from Siali leave sale in
Indian Rupees (min–max)
7,350 (3,000–14,400) 83% (83%) - -
Average annual collection of edible tubers in kg/hh (min–max) 400 (15–700) 100% (83%) 2.7 (1–30) 42% (0%)
Average annual collection of mushrooms in kg/hh (min–max) 23 (15–35) 100% (80%) 1.1 (1–10) 50% (4%)
Percentage of totality of tubers collected in Teen Mauza 97% 3%
Percentage of totality of mushrooms collected in Teen Mauza 80% 20%
a Percentage of households (of the total number of hhs in respective village) in which women collect.
8 The community forest of 155 ha has an average bamboo biomass of 55 t/ha,
while the total forest biomass is 93t/ha; this generates a total annual increment of
about 260 t of bamboo. We used Tripathi and Singh’s (1994) value of the annual
pole increment of ﬁve-year-old Dendrocalamus strictus of 3.17 t/ha/year (20% of
15.83 t). Considering that the current annual bamboo harvest in Teen Mauza is only
6.4 t, even if we assume an annual pole increment of 1 t/ha/year the overall
biological productivity of bamboo is ample to also accommodate the SC people’s
bamboo needs.
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help from the household) than the household which grazes only
30 goats (only one grazier). Comparing across all graziers, it
becomes evident that the absentee herd owner commands a much
larger bundle of access mechanisms pertaining to goat grazing and
thus has a higher degree of access. This entrepreneur has enough
ﬁnancial capital to acquire and maintain a large herd of 235 goats
by permanently hiring a group of three professional goat herders
of the herder-caste lineage, who are specialized in managing large
herds. The complementary access mechanism of labour availability
is thus easily met by the absentee herd owner, who is getting good
returns from forest grazing in Teen Mauza. A question that
emerges is: do grazing beneﬁts from the Teen Mauza forest
ecosystem disproportionally beneﬁt those who are already power-
ful and meet the relatively demanding socio-economic access
requirements of this service?
Another question pertaining to the absentee herd owner and
his herders is: In what case does access by outsiders constitute
unfair use? In general, grazing in the Ranpur area has been rather
ﬂexible and fuzzy. Although much of the forest is parcelled out
amongst different CFM groups, they permit each other’s members
to graze relatively unhindered across their boundaries: there is a
system of reciprocity between neighbouring communities. The
only rule affecting grazing in Teen Mauza is the general rule that
no fresh wood is allowed to be cut from the forest. This reciprocity
has probably emerged in the context of grazing being a subsis-
tence activity. However, with the advent of better transport and
expansion of the goat market, the urban-based absentee herd
owner in Teen Mauza has effectively come to use the community
forest for commercial gains.
The community does not object to his use of the forest for
grazing per se, as it does not generally violate community rules.
There is, however, one aspect of his grazing to which the commu-
nity strongly objects, namely the cutting-down of fresh branches
for young goats by his herders. With about 40 young goats to be
fed, this happens on quite a large scale.
Nevertheless, local residents feel they cannot forbid this prac-
tice: Some villagers even expressed that, in case there was strong
opposition to and retribution against the outside herd owner, they
would not feel safe anymore in the streets of the nearby town.
They are afraid that he, being a part of the cultural and political
elite of the town, would use his power against them. Because of
the vast socio-economic differences between the community
members and the outside herd-owner, the villagers assess that
he must be very powerful, although they do not have any concrete
experience to verify this. The outsider’s power thus seems to be
largely symbolic, inferred by the community through his dispro-
portionate ownership of assets. The community’s resulting fear
that keeps them from taking real action against the outsider’s
violation of community rules, however, is very real. Overall, the
arrival of the absentee herd owner – who has made good use of
their forest by using his power to get away with the violation of
community rules – has signiﬁcantly altered the local power
dynamics, resulting in a feeling of disempowerment in the
community.
5.2.3. NTFP collection and sale: Cultural norms and livelihood
identity
The Scheduled Tribes households of Teen Mauza collect a wide
variety of NTFPs from their forest: siali leaves, honey, various kinds
of fruits and green, leafy vegetables, and a variety of edible tubers,
mushrooms and medicinal plants. Only a small fraction of this,
both in quantity and variety, is collected by General Caste com-
munity members (see Table 4). The latter user group use income
derived non-forest-based livelihood activities to buy forest goods,
mostly edible tubers from Akhupadar.
Other than for bamboo extraction, there are no explicit rules
controlling access to NTFPs such as mushrooms or siali leaves.
Also, compared to grazing there are very few access barriers for
NTFP use: no start-up capital is required, and one can invest as
much labour as one wishes. Nevertheless, as we saw in Section
5.1.3, there are major differences in the use level of this ecosystem
service. The question is: why?
The main difference in beneﬁts among those who collect NTFPs
is the difference between low-level subsistence use and signiﬁcant,
subsidiary livelihood sale. The Scheduled Tribes people of Akhupa-
dar are the only residents of Teen Mauza who sell forest products to
earn subsidiary income, besides rice cultivation which is their main
source of sustenance and income. With several hours of siali leave
collection per week alone, the average household earns a supple-
mentary income of about 7500 Indian rupees annually (compared
to an annual minimum-wage income of around 54000). Also, Siali is
the only commercial forest product that is solely collected and
processed by women to generate separate income for themselves.
In Akhupadar, the collection of NTFPs in general is overwhel-
mingly a women’s activity, while in the non-ST villages, hardly any
women collect NTFPs. This can be explained by the fact that in
Hindu caste society, women generally do not engage in livelihood
activities beyond the domestic sphere. In the tribal society, how-
ever, women are on a much more equal footing with men (see
Maharatna, 1998; Mitra, 2008). Hence, these women can engage in
the collection, processing and sale of NTFPs, without social stigma.
In the ability to beneﬁt from NTFPs from the forest, the ability
to sell forest produce is the most important difference between
Scheduled Tribes and non-ST community members. In the process
of social control, the very transaction of money in exchange for
forest produce, thereby becoming ﬁnancially dependent on it,
appears to consolidate livelihood identity. Those who are selling
forest produce are seen as tribal people, who are therefore forest-
dependent and ‘backward’ in the eyes of people of different castes.
Consequently, the forest-dependent Scheduled Tribes people rank
lower in the social hierarchy than the non-ST community mem-
bers. This reﬂects the wider pattern in India where cultural norms
and social stigma strongly determine livelihood specialization, or
caste occupation (Joseph et al., 2010) and thus also inﬂuence
access to natural resources.
The position of the Scheduled Tribes people in Teen Mauza is
ambiguous. On the one hand, they are able to make good use of its
provisioning ecosystem services and are materially quite well-off
(none of the ST households was assessed to be in the poorest
wealth stratum, see Table 1). On the other hand, reliance on NTFPs
conﬁrms their lower status in the social hierarchy of Teen Mauza.
However, although some General Caste households of Teen Mauza
are very poor, landless and desperately need extra income, social
values and stigmas associated with caste prevent them from
making use of the forest's ecosystem services in the same way
that the Scheduled Tribe households do.
6. Discussion
The case study results clearly illustrate that the beneﬁts from
communally managed forests are unevenly distributed among
community members and other users of the forest. The variation
is determined by individual livelihood choices, resource-speciﬁc
needs, access (basic and complementary), as well exclusionary
social practices, power and social status, cultural identities and on-
going ‘micro-political’ processes. Clearly, not all variations in the
magnitude of beneﬁts derived can be seen as inequitable or unfair.
But given that, in a community forest, ecosystem beneﬁts come at
a cost (labour for protection), there are also clear instances where
those who beneﬁt do not pay any costs, especially the powerful
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herd owner who is based outside the village. Besides, there is
absolute exclusion of needy groups (from both protection and
beneﬁts). An aggregate ﬁgure for beneﬁts derived from the forest
by the entire set of users would hide information on these
inequities and their underlying processes.
The diverse range of situations observed in the Teen Mauza
case study cannot be explained by a single theoretical perspective.
This is brought out through our use of a multi-dimensional
approach, employing multiple explanatory theories. Indeed, our
investigation points to the need to not only allow for theoretical
approaches that use either agent-focused or structural explana-
tions, but also for dynamic interaction between both explanatory
frames (see e.g. Arts, 2012). On the one hand, use of the forest is
clearly being shaped by agent-based, individual livelihood choices
(e.g., whether to become a full-time grazier or not) and private
asset ownership (whether one has the money to invest in goats to
begin with, or to hire herders for grazing). On the other hand,
structural factors such as caste hierarchy and livelihood identities
play a role in determining who can or cannot access a certain
resource. In Teen Mauza, cultural identity (tied to caste identity,
but not necessarily socio-economic status) shapes and is shaped
by individual preferences as well as notions of what an acceptable
livelihood may be. This makes livelihood identity both a structural
and agency-driven force.
Some households may not make use of the NTFP resource
because of culturally-enforced, caste-based livelihood identities.
This cultural aspect of ecosystem services distribution does not
feature prominently in much of the natural resource use literature
(with a few notable exceptions: see Crane, 2010). It also reinforces
Milgroom’s et al. (2014) argument that micro-scale distributional
processes of ecosystem services are obscured by the macro- or
meso-scale at which most studies of natural resource distribution
are conducted.
At an analytical level, some of the distributional dynamics of
resource use in Teen Mauza are situated beyond the ambit of
conventional political economy and ecology. It appears that in case
of near-equal assets and access, but clear differences in resource use,
which in Teen Mauza is the case pertaining to NTFP distribution,
access runs short as an informing theory. As in this case, material
barriers to access do not play a decisive role (NTFPs are accessible if
people have interest to harvest them), symbolic barriers in the form
of cultural norms, ordinarily submerged under larger inequities and
political ecological struggle, emerge as important factors in ecosys-
tem services distribution. We thus found that while ecosystem
service use obviously has direct material consequences for the user
(more calories or saleable goods), it can also have important
symbolic implications in terms of social status or taboo, adding a
layer of complexity to understanding incentives and barriers to
being able to beneﬁt from ecosystem services.
Our study shows that local forest-dependent communities can
best be seen as an assembly of subcultures (Scheduled Tribes
people, rice farmers, graziers, wage labourers, Scheduled Castes
basket-makers), all with distinct livelihood practices, social insti-
tutions, values, identities and interrelationships (see Crane, 2010;
Staddon, 2009) as well as socio-historical backgrounds and speciﬁc
settlement histories. This also highlights the importance of histor-
ical analysis in resource distribution. As in Teen Mauza, the
bamboo artisans arrived after the ﬁrst protection committee had
been formed, their exclusion is part of a larger conﬂict between
the original forest protectors and those who arrived later to the
community. The latter implies also that notions of social exclusion
and casteism are not simply imposed by wider discriminatory
societal structures, but are at least co-determined by local history
(Biersack, 2006; Tsing, 2005).
Stepping back from the questions of distribution and inequity,
this study also empirically underlines the point (made conceptually
elsewhere: see Lele et al. 2013) that ecosystem ‘services’ do not
automatically ﬂow from ecosystems to human beings, but are
largely co-produced through human labour, capital and technolo-
gies. A purely ecological characterisation of the Teen Mauza forest
cannot tell us anything about the type and magnitude of services it
actually provides or can provide, since these only emerge in
particular livelihood and institutional contexts. Taking a step
further, the Teen Mauza forest is itself largely a product of livelihood
and institutional practices, making a ‘purely’ ecological character-
isation impossible. Knowing the general pattern of forest depen-
dency in a particular region is inadequate at describing how
beneﬁts are produced and distributed, as the actual ﬂow depends
upon so many micro-level practices and situations. Our case study
thus shows that the links between ecosystems and human well-
being can be better understood using integrated approaches, such
as that of social-ecological systems research (see Berkes and Folke,
1998; Folke et al., 2005, Holling 2001).
We are aware that drawing attention to access mechanisms and
other social processes that result in inequitable gains from natural
resources is the bread and butter of much of the political ecology
literature. Our contribution here, however, lies primarily in bring-
ing this perspective to bear upon the ecosystem services literature
(which has been devoid of social distribution) to demonstrate that
outcomes can even differ across various ecosystem services in the
same ecosystems and communities. At the same time, we have
demonstrated that the processes through which such differences
occur are not always political or structurally driven.
In addition, our ﬁndings verify the usefulness of Fisher et al.’s
(2013) novel framework for ecosystem services assessment, espe-
cially the important role of agents’ individual characteristics, such
as entitlements, endowments, capitals and assets, and preferences
in access to and control over natural resources. However, our
analysis goes beyond their framework, by drawing attention to
factors such as livelihood identities and the role of cultural norms/
social control9.
7. Conclusion
In India alone, there are approximately 200 million forest-
dependent people (Khare et al. 2000). This one case study is not
meant to be representative of India’s forest-dependent communities,
let alone for forest landscapes beyond India. The aim of this paper is
not to generalize, but to empirically illustrate the principle that
ecosystem services distribution is a function of context-dependent
social dynamics. In this ﬁnal section, we outline the theoretical and
methodological implications for the ﬁeld of ecosystem services
research, where such distributional processes are by and large invisible
due to the scale of aggregation at which research is generally
conducted.
To conclude, our case study ﬁndings point out important theore-
tical and methodological implications for the ﬁeld of ecosystem
services research, especially pertaining to its aggregate nature and
the underlying social processes it so overlooks, and subsequently to
the ecosystem management this engenders, suggesting the ﬁeld to
take a more process-oriented, context-speciﬁc, and integrated
approach.
First, aggregated studies do not obtain insight into the processes
of social distribution and exclusion and thus are unable to gain
insight into, let alone address, issues of inequity pertaining to
ecosystem use. This also means that such research, oblivious of real
processes, implicitly uses assumptions to conceptualize the
9 Although livelihood identities are to some extent comparable to preferences,
they posses much more structural elements as well, reinforced by social control: if
one does not adhere, he/she will be treated differently in the community.
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relationships between people and nature. Our ﬁndings suggest that
there is a need to empirically scrutinize such standard assumptions,
for instance, that safeguarding certain combinations of ecosystem
services will automatically lead to poverty alleviation. Notably, in
Teen Mauza the poorest are not the most forest-dependent.
Second, this study implies that the beneﬁts from ecosystems
are seldom equally distributed, with the more well-endowed
actors (especially wealthy urban actors in the global economy)
being better able to beneﬁt, even without contributing to forest
protection, while some people are not at all able to derive well-
being from certain ecosystem services. We argue that equity,
which we see as an integral aspect of human well-being and
development, should be on the research agenda of ecosystem
services researchers. These should start paying attention to how
supposedly neutral (changes in) ecosystem services’ provisioning
in fact can reinforce existing inequities.
Third, generic, aggregated assessments of ecosystem-based well-
being often result in top-down, one-size-ﬁts-all ecosystemmanage-
ment interventions in the international environmental policy arena
(Adger et al., 2001), e.g. environmental cost-beneﬁt analysis, PES
and REDDþ . These assessments are rooted in a discourse that
Adger et al. (2001) coin the global environmental management
debate, which is characterised by “a technocentric worldview by
which blueprints based on international policy interventions can
solve global environmental dilemmas”. However, as the authors
argue, such generalistic management interventions are often locally
not appropriate, and may even be counter-productive (ibid.).
Following on these ﬁndings, we call on ecosystem services
research to adopt an approach that focuses more on localized
social processes of beneﬁt obtainment, which will help overcome
its shortcomings and blind spots. This paper shows that the social
distribution of ecosystem services cannot be explained by mono-
causal approaches and requires more nuanced conceptualisation
and methodology. Our study and Fisher et al.’s (2013) framework
represent the ﬁrst steps in fostering much-needed inter-disciplin-
ary research collaborations in ecosystem services research
between ecologists, economists and social scientists, integrating
access theory, political ecological, qualitative sociological, cultural
identity, and social–ecological systems approaches within the
ongoing inquiry.
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